Michigan Law Review
Volume 58

Issue 6

1960

Hart & Honoré: Causation in the Law
Luke K. Cooperrider
University of Michigan Law School

Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr
Part of the Law and Philosophy Commons, and the Legal Writing and Research Commons

Recommended Citation
Luke K. Cooperrider, Hart & Honoré: Causation in the Law, 58 MICH. L. REV. 951 (1960).
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr/vol58/iss6/18

This Book Reviews is brought to you for free and open access by the Michigan Law Review at University of
Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Michigan Law Review by an
authorized editor of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For more information, please
contact mlaw.repository@umich.edu.

1960]

RECENT BOOKS

951

CAUSATION IN THE LAW. By H. L. A. Hart and A. M. Honore. London:
Oxford University Press. 1959. Pp. xxxii, 454. $8.80.
What is the meaning, wherever found, of a legal proposition that a
given event is to be attributed to a prior contingency if, but only if, the
former was caused by the latter?
Countless statutory prescriptions and judicial pronouncements are
phrased in these simple terms. That the simplicity is deceptive must
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surely be understood, for the relevant exegetics are exceeded in their
variety only by their bulk. That the lawgiver has so rarely chosen to
define the attributive nexus in more precise terms roust appear as one of
the great curiosities of the law unless it be that he nevertheless assumes
the phrase "caused by" to convey a meaning sufficient to his ends. In this
country contemporary writers have persuaded themselves, and much of
the profession, that in the nature of things the phrase can mean nothing
more than that the contingency is a necessary condition of the event, and
that all other considerations which have in the past appeared under the
rubric "proximate cause" are properly understood only if filed in different pigeon-holes, "duty," "negligence," "policy" and the like; in short,
that nothing useful can be said under the heading "cause" except that
one condition or occurrence is a cause of another. This view seems to
have derived from the realization that any happening is attributable to
the coexistence of a very large number of conditions, the absence of any
one of which would have forestalled the event, and the conviction that
there is no philosophically valid reason for singling out any one of them
as "the cause."
Judges, on the other hand, have for many years claimed a common
sense rather than a philosophical descent for the concept of cause in its
legal aspect. The authors of Causation in the Law believe this claim to
be sound. They also believe that the "cause in fact" notion does not
accurately reflect common understanding of the word "cause." The conclusion is asserted rather than demonstrated, and presumably issues from
the authors' own awareness of common sense concepts. In this respect,
however, they are on no less firm ground than the authorities whose views
they dispute.
When, they argue, an ordinary roan in his daily pursuits refers to
the cause of an event, he is not merely pointing out that absent the one
the other would not have occurred. His problem is not that of the philosopher, or of the scientist, who is concerned with types of occurrences, and
seeks invariable sequences as the bases of general rules. The focus of his
attention is, rather, a particular occurrence, a departure from the normal
or expected sequence of events, for which he seeks an explanation. The
complete explanation would be the entire set of conditions, without every
one of which the event would not have occurred. Nevertheless he quite
habitually selects one of these conditions and calls it "the cause." In
doing so, he identifies to his own satisfaction the factor which made the
difference between normal course and abnormal event.
This notion of cause is not simple; it is, rather, a group of related
ideas. The roost elementary is that of the actor who is thought of as having done something. Simple transitive verbs are used - push, pull, bend,
break - describing an immediate bodily manipulation of a thing. Such
manipulations frequently are carried out for the purpose of producing
secondary effects, whereupon the terminology of cause and effect first
enters. One pushes his enemy over the cliff and causes his death. These
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are the cases where "cause and effect" has its most obvious application;
they are also paradigms for the use of causal language in other kinds of
cases, many of which are quite different in content from the basic model.
The central part played by voluntary human intervention is traced, therefore, to the very root of the concept. The deliberate production of an
effect, wherever present, is in itself a sufficient explanation. One need
look no farther.
The use of the word "cause" in everyday life, however, extends far beyond
these simple cases. The other idea which dominates thinking is the contrast between what is abnormal and what is normal in relation to a given
thing or subject matter. When one seeks an explanation for an event,
factors which are normal are disregarded, because they do not make the
difference. The abnormal factor, which does make the difference, can be
thought of as intervening or intruding into an existing state of affairs,
and an analogy is seen to the basic case, the deliberate production of an
effect. On the other hand, what is normal is not necessarily that which
happens naturally. Human intervention may be normal, and an omission
to intervene abnormal. The omission, therefore, in certain contexts will
be the factor that makes the difference between the usual, expected course
of events and the abnormal occurrence. When this is true it achieves
causal status.
What creates difficulty for lawyers is the fact that frequently there is
found among the conditions required to account for a given harm, in
addition to the action of the person whose conduct is being examined, a
£actor (usually human action or a striking physical phenomenon) which
itself has some of the characteristics by which common sense distinguishes
causes from mere conditions, so that there seems as much reason to attribute the harm to this third factor as to the action of the party in question. The explanation for the idea that such events "break the chain of
causation" is that, unlike normal conditions, they seem to destroy the
analogy to the simple cause and effect cases. In the case of a voluntary
human intervention, for instance, the intervener is not simply an instrument through which the remote actor has done something. His is a "new
action" or "new cause," in itself a sufficient explanation of the event, and
a reason for disregarding more remote conditions which are simply part
of the set stage upon which he has acted. The other type of circumstance
which is regarded as breaking the causal chain is that of "mere coincidence." If A strikes B, who falls to the ground, where he is struck and
killed by a falling tree, the conjunction of the two events being very unlikely, occurring without human contrivance, and the second event being
entirely independent of the first, common sense regards A's blow as the
cause of B's bruise, but not of his death. When an abnormal condition
essential to the harm exists prior to the act, on the other hand, the unexpected harm is not regarded as coincidence, but is traced to the act, for
the abnormal condition is merely part of the subject upon which the actor
acts, part of the stage which has been set before his "intervention."
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Finally, there is a category of situation which is commonly, but metaphorically, described in causal language wherein the insulating effect of
voluntary intervention and coincidence do not operate in the manner
just described. This category is designated by the authors "occasioning
harm" to set it apart from the cases wherein "causing harm" is the more
appropriate term. It includes those cases in which the actor has provided
another with a reason to do harm, or has provided or abnormally failed
to remove an opportunity for another or for a natural event to do harm.
The use of the latter notion in the law is an extension of the idea, common in non-legal thought, that the neglect of a precaution ordinarily
taken against harm is the cause of the harm which thereafter occurs. In
such cases the causal connection is not negatived by those factors which
would have that effect in the simpler type of case.
This is a very inadequate outline of the authors' description of the
common-sense concept of cause, which becomes the point of departure
for an extremely detailed discussion and exemplification of its influence
on the solution of legal problems in the areas of tort, contract and crime.
In the course of their discussion they also consider, and reject as inadequate to explain the cases, competing analyses of the limits of responsibility
in terms of foreseeability and risk, and criticize theories of causation
which are current upon the continent. The job done is extremely thorough, with a dogged consideration and reconcilation of problem cases,
actual and hypothetical. In details the argument is debatable. The Palsgraf decision is attacked under the assumption that it represents a limitation on liability for culpably caused harm, rather than a criterion of
culpability. "Foreseeability" appears as something of a straw-man, for it
is doubtful that anybody urges it as a limitation in the general terms
which are assumed as the basis for critique. There is in some instances a
zeal to reconcile cases which suggests excessive commitment to the concept. In the main, however, the book seems to me to present a most
revealing and potentially a most useful dissection of common modes of
thought which are introduced into a consideration of legal problems,
almost unobserved, by the semantics of the situation. When I call upon
my own awareness of common-sense concepts to test the thesis, I am forced
to conclude that a lawyer's training somewhat beclouds the issue. Nevertheless, the criticism of the "there is no cause but cause in fact" notion
as a completely inaccurate reflection of ordinary thought has, for me, a
distinct odor of truth. The analysis offers a plausible explanation for the
special treatment which judges have always accorded cases involving human
intervening causes, although in this respect one puzzle still remains. The
authors' proposition is that voluntary conduct (i.e., the free, informed,
deliberate act or omission of a human being intended to produce the
consequence which is in fact produced, or conduct reckless of that consequence) intervening after the act of the party in question negatives causal
connection, whereas involuntary conduct, which is defined to include
negligent conduct, does not. It is my impression that, despite the disgrace
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into which the last wrongdoer rule has fallen, cases are still decided, not
infrequently, in which negligent intervention is held to have that effect.
I therefore wonder whether the common-sense view of the situation may
not also include within the basic cause model, to an extent which perhaps
is incapable of definition, the negligent production of an effect by affirmative conduct.
The authors do not maintain that their common-sense concept of
causation is the sole factor which determines legal limits of responsibility
for conduct. They concede, and indeed advocate, that the scope of a
given rule of liability should be defined with an eye to the policy which
the rule was intended to effec~ate. What they do contend, however, is
that aside from the guidance they have sought in the policy of the rule,
courts have responded to the commonly-held view of causation and utilized
it as an additional matrix of legal responsibility. This analysis will probably not suggest a different result in very many cases from that which is
otherwise achieved. It may, however, be an explanation of the result
which is a more accurate reflection of the psychology of decision than
that which has heretofore been advanced.

Luke K. Cooperrider,
Professor of Law,
University of Michigan

